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The broad aspirations of social policy in the European Un-
ion continue to be the preserve of the Member States as 
the particular histories, ideas, and institutions upon which 
national social policies are based remain quite heteroge-
neous. A process of convergence is nevertheless discern-
ible in respect of policy implementation. The reasons for 
this relate to the nature of the European integration pro-
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cess but should not be confused with the broad adoption 
of a notional European Social Model, the harmonisation 
of national policies or, more generally, with the classical 
approach to EU policy making in the social field. This pa-
per instead explores how the implementation typology on 
Social Services of General Interest produced by Humer 
et al. (2013) can be understood in relation to the way in 
which the European Commission has continued to act as 
a “purposeful opportunist” by employing “policy entrepre-
neurism” in the context of the various ‘new governance” 
approaches associated with EU social policy. 
Key words: services of general interest, social services of 
general interest, social services
1. Introduction
Although it was little more than a footnote in the Treaty of Rome of 
1957, Services of General Interest (SGI)1 is now a key EU policy area.2 
Indeed, SGI, and Social Services of General Interest (SSGI), its social 
sub-category, have attained a level of recognition at the EU level that 
remains puzzling. Unlike SGI and Services of General Economic Interest 
(SGEI) however, SSGI currently supports no legally binding definition 
(Szyszczak, 2013: 317) – there is no Treaty basis for SSGI and the Mem-
ber States (MSs) cannot agree on its boundaries (Bauby, 2013: 50-51; van 
de Gronden, 2011: 150–151). It can however be viewed as a useful device 
for the Commission of the European Union (CEU), acting as a “purpose-
ful opportunist” in its attempt to shape the policy process, as ambiguity 
1 While the notion of Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI) was contained 
in Article 86 of the Rome Treaty, 25 March 1957, the broader notion of Services of General 
Interest (SGI) was only developed in relation to the Treaty of Amsterdam, 2 October 1997, 
while the term Social Services of General Interest (SSGI) only emerged in the Presidency 
Conclusions of the Laeken European Council meeting 14–15 December 2001.
2 This work draws on the findings of previous contributions focusing on the EU as 
a regulatory state, using “stealthy” (Majone, 2009) “covert” (Genschel, Jachtenfuchs et al., 
2014) and “uninvited” (Greer, 2006) methods to further its preferred policy goals often in 
opposition, though rarely directly so, to the stated interests of some member states. The 
authors are grateful for constructive comments from Prof. Hellmut Wollman, Prof. Gerard 
Marcou and Dr. Alois Humer as well as from the two anonymous reviewers of the journal 
on a previous version of this paper.
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often protects the CEU’s preferred policy alternative from outright MSs 
opposition. The notion of “purposeful opportunism” refers to organisa-
tional activity which displays inherently flexible methods in the pursuit of 
set overall objectives and/or goals.3
In broad terms, SSGI are seen as measures addressing risk and vulnerabil-
ities in life (EC, 2007: 7–8), which facilitate social inclusion and the safe-
guarding of fundamental rights (EC, 2010: 16–17). The notion of SSGI 
has, in part, been used by the CEU as one of a number of tools and/or 
strategies designed to “shape” the policy making environment in the EU 
Social Policy field – a field in which EU institutions ostensibly have only 
limited powers vis-a-vis the MSs (Bauby, 2011: 34–35). Similarly, the fo-
cus on “implementation” (in relation to low level day-to-day politics) rath-
er than on the often rarefied arena of policy making as inter-state bargain-
ing provides another mechanism through which the CEU is able to exert 
broader “policy goal” influence (see for instance, Cram, 1997: 61–97).
This paper seeks to provide an explanatory framework for the results pro-
duced by the Humer et al. (2013: 150–154) dataset. The initial point fo-
cussed on understanding how much “convergence” was occurring in terms 
of SSGI implementation. The second step sought to problematize the 
typology results by questioning why, in a context where institutional MSs’ 
dominance prevails in the broad EU social policy field, “implementation 
convergence” in terms of SSGI nevertheless occurs. The third step iden-
tifies a suitable theoretical approach to understanding the mechanisms 
involved while the fourth step attempts to confirm its appropriateness.
Section one draws a distinction between the underlying assumptions of 
traditional social policy typologies and the Humer et al. (2013) approach, 
turning the focus away from “ideal” types and the policy-making level to 
consider instead “real” types and policy implementation. While the da-
taset itself is not a time series and thus only shows a “snapshot” of what 
3 See Cram (1997) and originally Klein and O’Higgins (1985). The CEU is able to 
do this through its power to shape agendas and frame policy developments, packaging its 
policies and selecting the way in which they will be presented in the least conflicting manner 
possible. With the limited resources available to it, it also seeks to mobilise or create its own 
constituency of support through the sponsoring and promotion of research and learning 
functions while preparing the field for future action – seed funding, soft law measures etc. 
Action is always rationalised in accordance with topical situations while continual low-key 
attempts are made to stretch the current legal basis for action. Finally, strategic learning 
and flexibility are key as events are allowed to run their course in the expectation that new 
policy windows of opportunity will present themselves. Adept, flexible, and goal-oriented, 
the CEU plays the “long” game.
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may be occurring, historical and institutional analysis is used to “fill the 
gaps” and therefore supplements the overall picture provided. The results 
suggest that the traditional welfare clusters – when viewed through an 
implementation prism – are becoming less distinct. Moreover, they are at-
tracting the NMS into their orbits and consequently, no new “Post-Com-
munist” cluster is discernible. Therefore, there is a convergence of sorts 
taking place.
Section two situates these findings within a historical and institutional EU 
context – specifically in relation to the development of EU social policy 
competences and debates. The notion of social policy is used here as a 
framework within which to discuss SSGI. This is necessary because of SS-
GI’s lack of legal standing in the EU framework. It is however important to 
take account of the broader EU debate on “services”/SGI and the fraught 
definitional relationship between SGI/SSGI.4 This is manifested particu-
larly strongly when discussing the clash between EU Competition Law, 
where the various mechanisms of the internal market are seen as the driv-
ing force of integration and, as such, given primacy over national law, and 
historic and continuing MS dominance in the social policy field limiting the 
utility of further harmonisation measures via the traditional “Community 
Method”. If integration is unable to occur in the traditional way, and con-
vergence seems to be occurring nevertheless, how can this be explained?
Section three is tasked with outlining a suitable theoretical framework to 
situate the questions arising from sections one and two. The broad frame-
work chosen was that of historical institutionalism (Steinmo, 2010; Hall, 
Taylor, 1996; Stone et al., 2001; Pierson, 2004). This was preferred over 
traditional state-centric Integration Theory approaches and specifically 
over the Liberal Intergovernmentalism of Moravcsik (1998) primarily be-
cause of the way in which “institutions” are viewed by each approach – as 
potentially active or passive structures.
Following Knill (2001: 4–5) a second layer of analysis is also included to 
deal with the traditionally perceived deterministic and conservative bias 
within HI as an explanatory approach. As such, the notion of “agency” is 
operationalized with reference to the CEU’s “purposeful opportunism” 
and its ongoing role as a “policy entrepreneur”.5
4  The work of Neergaard (2009: 20; 2013: 210) provides a useful overview of how the 
different sub-categories of SGI are related to each other while Hatzopoulos (2010: 42–47) 
and Szyszczak (2013: 318–20) also provide useful summaries. 
5  Radaelli and Dunlop (2013: 935) also point to the possible fruitful combination of 
HI and PO.
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Referencing the secondary literature, the fourth section confirms support 
for the notion of CEU’s “purposeful opportunism” and policy entrepre-
neurship in respect of SSGI implementation. This is followed by a brief 
concluding section.
While the notion of an emerging European welfare state coalescing 
around the outputs of European social policy and informed by reference 
to the “European Social Model”, has been extensively discussed (Adnett, 
Hardy, 2005; Kleinman, 2002; Cousins, 2005; Ferrera, 2005; Hay, Win-
cott, 2012; Taylor-Gooby, 2004), the “institutionalisation” of SSGI, par-
ticularly in relation to service implementation, is a subject that has not 
received much attention. Similarly, while the legal literature on SGI/SSGI 
is already voluminous, little attempt is made therein to conceptualise the 
“motivations” of the institutions involved. This paper intends to address 
these gaps in the literature and extols their virtue as much neglected cen-
tral pieces in the EU social landscape.
2. A Typology of SSGI Implementation
The typology produced by Humer et al. (2013: 156) sought to investigate 
two perceived gaps in comparative European welfare research. First, the 
paucity of investigation into process as opposed to outcomes or ideals; 
specifically, welfare services and their modes of production, financing, 
organisation, and delivery. A real-type analysis, which focuses on the 
implementation6 of welfare, will produce a different result to that of an 
ideal-type analysis, focusing on policy formulation and theoretical policy 
visions.
The second identified gap focuses on the limited availability of data on 
welfare regimes beyond the “traditional” EU15/EFTA research area, 
suggesting a lack of comprehensiveness, and a reliance on selective case 
studies rather than a comprehensive approach. In the extended version 
6  A different approach here would have been to focus on the notion of “street level 
bureaucrats” (Lipsky, 1980) which suggests that the way in which public policy is imple-
mented and administered is the primary factor in its success. Implementation then is not 
just a technical matter but is primarily constitutive of how the policy in question is produced, 
received, and understood. Our focus on institutions, namely the CEU, is congruent with this 
approach. Though obviously pitched at a different scale it nevertheless shares a discourse 
centred around the impact of concepts such as “governance”, New Public Management 
(NPM), and neo-liberalism.
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of Esping-Anderson’s typology, presented by Ebbinghaus (2012: 14) for 
instance, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia are the only 
NMS included, together with Germany and Austria.
Humer et al. (2013: 161–162) chose to operationalize the implementation 
of SSGI in terms of process – the provision of services (in a spatial con-
text). The typology addresses policy modes and territorial organisation for 
SSGI encompassing 31 European countries (Table 1) with the focus on 
implementation – not policy formulation. This typology focused on real-type 
social phenomena rather than Weberian ideal types. A database was creat-
ed by means of primary data collection. National experts in the 31 stud-
ied countries were consulted on (sub-) national organisational matters in 
respect to nine key welfare services related to education, health and care, 
labour market policy, social housing and social transfer schemes.
The level of service organisation was expressed in relation to four attrib-
utes – two social and two territorial. From a socio-political perspective, 
the production and financing modes of a certain welfare service provided 
the primary focus of attention. The experts had to decide whether a par-
ticular service was provided and/or financed by state institutions, market 
mechanisms, or civic/familial engagement. From a territorial perspective, 
the responsible governance level and the degree of involvement in service 
provision by the spatial planning agenda, broadly defined, were the main 
attributes. The experts identified whether service responsibility was locat-
ed at the national, regional, or local government level or – where no state 
responsibility existed – at the “individual level”. The level of influence of 
spatial planning programmes and instruments on service provision illus-
trates whether service delivery is, in effect, territorially organised. In some 
cases, planning policies are explicit in designating locations or routes for 
service provision, while in others they impact on service provision only 
implicitly. Some countries simply do not address service provision matters 
in their planning instruments. Moreover, the character of a service, for 
example, social transfer schemes, often makes it unnecessary a priori to 
tackle with territorial policies.
The collected expert data was sorted by means of a quantitative multivar-
iate method of cluster analysis focusing on the “furthest neighbour” ap-
proach. The analysis for the abovementioned 31 European states resulted 
in a typology consisting of three grand types comprising two to four types. 
The decision to divide the European states into types and grand types is 
statistically supported by what is termed the “elbow-criteria” (Ketchen, 
Shook, 1996).
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Given that Belgium and the Netherlands cluster very late, we consider 
them outliers and will not discuss them further at this time. The prob-
lems associated with classifying the Netherlands and its welfare system 
have, for instance, been identified in previous research (Esping-Andersen, 
1990, 1999; Hicks, Kenworthy, 2003). Table 1 shows the division of Euro-
pean states into several clusters and their characteristics. 
Table 1: Types of Welfare Service Organisation in Europe 
































12 ES, IT fragmentation regional implicit
13 CY, MT mainly public national implicit


















mainly public national & local implicit
23
AT, CH, 
DE, FR, LT, 
PL, UK
mainly public regional & local explicit

















Source: Modified from Humer et al., 2013
The first type contains eight countries7 and is characterised by an im-
plicit territorial organisation in respect of SSGI. In the smaller countries, 
responsibility for SSGI is located at the national level while in the larger 
countries it generally lies at the regional level. Effectively, this means that 
7  Croatia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, and Malta.
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the controlling administrative unit is, in population terms, rather similar. 
With the exception of Cyprus and Malta, the production and financing 
of SSGI is “fragmented”, i.e. there is no logic or system in the produc-
tion and financing. In Cyprus and Malta, responsibility for production 
and financing remains public, probably for reasons of scale. A second 
type contains only three countries (Greece, Hungary, and Ireland) and 
is characterised by the explicitly territorial organisation of SSGI. Here 
the national level exercises responsibility for SSGI delivery with produc-
tion and financing being public. The final type contains the remaining 17 
countries8 and is characterised by the strong territorial organisation of 
SSGI. Responsibility is located at the local level with both the production 
and financing of SSGI being predominantly public.
Eight of the thirteen New Member States have adopted a similar ap-
proach to that of the grand cluster; Hungary is the only NMS in the small-
est cluster while four NMS (Croatia, Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus) show 
similarities to the “Mediterranean” cluster. This is not, however, to sug-
gest that convergence at the policy formulation level has taken place in 
the analysed countries.
Although Ebbinghaus (2012) focused on ideal-types while Humer et al. 
(2013) focused on real-types, with the exception of Hungary, the expec-
tation that the four NMS he discusses would gravitate towards Germany 
and Austria appears to have been confirmed. Interestingly, Draxler and 
Van Vliet (2010: 19) argued that the NMS show no signs of convergence 
to the west. Their study however focuses on policy formulation and ide-
al-types while their analysis relates only to the period 2000-06. It is per-
haps optimistic to assume policy formulation will change radically after 
such a short period as institutional inertia will inevitably slow the process. 
Contrary to Draxler and Van Vliet, the results uncovered by Humer et al., 
indicate that “something” has happened in relation to SSGI implementa-
tion.
The countries in the grand type 1 are, with the exception of Spain and 
Italy, small (Croatia, Slovenia, Luxembourg, Cyprus and Malta) to me-
dium-sized (Portugal) geographically. The territorial organisation of 
welfare services is implicit in all the countries in this grand type 1, i.e. 
welfare services are only loosely or indirectly tied to a certain territory or 
8  Denmark, Latvia, Norway, Romania, Sweden, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, France, Lithuania, Poland and 
the United Kingdom.
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geographical unit. At first glance, the level of administrative and plan-
ning responsibility for welfare appears heterogeneous. This needs some 
clarification.
In Cyprus, Malta, Croatia, Luxembourg, Slovenia and Portugal, all rela-
tively small countries in population terms and geographically, responsibil-
ity remains at the national level. In Spain and Italy responsibility lies with 
the relatively autonomous and, in some cases, independent regions. The 
size, population-wise and geographically, of e.g. Navarra or Trentino-Al-
to-Adige is about the same as Croatia or Slovenia. Thus while the level of 
administrative and planning responsibility for welfare here is heterogene-
ous de jure this is not necessarily the case de facto. In Spain, Italy, Croatia, 
Luxembourg, Slovenia, and Portugal, the level of private influence in the 
production and financing of social welfare is marked. For the two smallest 
countries, Malta and Cyprus, production and financing is mainly through 
public sector institutions. One plausible explanation for this may be the 
desire for economies of scale.
The 17 countries in grand type 2 come from across Europe. The financing 
and production of welfare services in these countries is mainly undertaken 
through public financing. The local level generally plays a key role here 
and exercises administrative and planning responsibility for social welfare. 
With the exception of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, 
and Iceland, welfare services are explicitly tied to a certain territory or 
geographical unit. In those countries where this is not the case, welfare 
services are loosely or indirectly tied to a certain territory or geographical 
unit.
Grand type 3 contains three countries: Greece, Hungary, and Ireland. 
Here, welfare services are explicitly tied to a certain territory or geograph-
ical unit and the national level has administrative and planning responsi-
bility for social welfare. The financing and production of welfare services 
is undertaken mainly through the public purse in Greece, Hungary, and 
Ireland.
At first glance, it appears reasonable that Greece, Hungary, and Ireland 
have clustered. All three are “over-centralised” (Tsekos, Triantafyllopou-
lou, 2015: 22; Horváth, 2015: 11; The Irish Times, 2015). However, the 
socio-economic problems in Greece, Hungary and Ireland, exacerbated 
by the financial collapse of 2008, are numerous and multifaceted. It is 
clear that these countries are effectively experiencing an economic tran-
sition process that has been interrupted. Thus, they are now waiting in 
a “half-way-house” between welfare regimes (Hay, Wincott, 2012: 156–
676
J. Smith, Christopher, D. Rauhut (2015) Stealthy, Covert and Uninvited? ...







157; Matsaganis, 2011: 510; Strathopoulos, 1996: 136–137; Ferge, Tausz, 
2002: 180; Horváth, 2015: 17–19). Clearly, this has also manifested itself 
in terms of their implementation of SSGI.
Although the “Mediterranean” cluster appears disparate, the discussion 
here has shown that from an implementation perspective these countries 
have many commonalities. While the smallest cluster, containing Greece, 
Hungary, and Ireland, initially appears rather odd, the discussion has 
shown that these countries also have – from an implementation perspec-
tive – many commonalities. Furthermore, the big cluster, including coun-
tries from all but the Mediterranean part of Europe, has many commonal-
ities implementation wise. It thus appears that the SSGI implementation 
typology by Humer et al. (2013) is robust and reasonable.
3. Social Policy and the EU
As noted previously, SGI has moved from anonymity to centre stage in 
the EU’s legal and political debate (Neergaard, 2009: 17) even though 
the broad notion remains routed primarily in EU Commission’s “soft law” 
documents.
The basis of the legal settlement between the MSs and the supranational 
institutions is that the economic constitution of the treaties – primarily 
competition and internal market rules – only apply to economic activities, 
public services of a non-economic nature are thus not captured by these 
rules. This was meant to provide a clear demarcation between the MSs 
and the EU – with social policy clearly in the MSs realm with the EU eco-
nomic rules set aside in the general (state level) interest. However, tech-
nological advances, regulatory experimentation, political pressure from 
the CEU and judicial engagement on the part of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) have all conspired to destabilise this original assumption 
particularly with respect to what qualifies as a non-economic service and 
where social policies such as healthcare fit into this ever-changing sche-
ma (Hatzopoulos, 2012: 38) leading Neergaard et al. (2013: 8) to note 
that “liberalisation has broken down or blurred traditional boundaries of 
the state provision of goods and services in the social sector”. Ongoing 
attempts at the national level to reduce public expenditure and powerful 
changes in Europe’s demographic patterns as well as shifts in consumer 
tastes in respect of public service provision have all combined to produce 
a situation where traditional approaches to welfare provision are seen as 
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increasingly under threat (Szyszczak, 2013: 320). It is in this context that 
the EU social policy and SSGI implementation must be viewed.
At the national level, social policy has historically functioned as an inte-
grator effectively helping to cast European states in their current form, as 
such it is clearly constitutive of their national sovereignty. Indeed, Mar-
tinsen is unequivocal on this point, noting, “In its gradual development, 
welfare came to constitute a decisive means of national integration, where 
material rights and obligations linked the state and civil society together” 
(2013: 54; see also Ferrera, 2003, and Giddens, 1994). While similarities 
exist between national welfare institutions and philosophies and “family 
relationships” can be drawn, at root each is path-dependent, based on 
specific national histories, ideas and institutions. With national security 
and macroeconomic policy increasingly impacted by decisions and agree-
ments (and/or social, political and economic forces) beyond the control 
of individual sovereigns, the desire to maintain control over welfare and 
re-distributional issues within individual states is clear and is fundamen-
tally linked to the continuing political legitimacy of and democratic soli-
darity within national level structures – producing social citizenship – and 
the power to set rights and obligations and define who is to be protected. 
Moreover, it is clear that state-level welfare provision has expanded expo-
nentially in the half century since the European integration process began 
(Ferrera, 2005: 171; Hay, Wincott, 2012: 99; Pestieau, 2006: 78–90).
The original six EU members intended welfare to be produced by eco-
nomic growth not regulatory intervention. Thus, with exceptions relating 
to market-making measures such as Equal Pay and the removal of barriers 
to Labour Mobility, supranational competence in the social field was se-
verely restricted as social policy was deemed to lie outside the economic 
constitution of the Treaty. While significant economic powers were ceded 
to supranational institutions, particularly in relation to the single market, 
in the social field the subsidiarity9 “formula” emerged, stipulating that 
competence to decide on the content, scope, and organisation of welfare 
policies remains within the realm of national competences – as long as the 
exercise of that competence does not contradict EU law.
With the “social space” colonised by the MSs and with economic and 
commercial policy the primary focus of integration, this formula proved a 
9  Note however that, since the late 1990s, the meaning of the term has undergone a 
subtle change, from the notion that there is a clear dividing line between governance levels 
to one where there is a necessity for supple co-ordination across various levels of governance 
(see De La Porte, Pochet, 2003: 32).
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workable compromise, but over time, with enlargement introducing new 
members with increasingly divergent welfare systems and philosophies 
and the CEU’s desire to promote cohesion by promoting “a level playing 
field”, the EU has effectively created a framework where the MSs are now 
forced to rationalise century-long practices, often dictated by ill-defined 
interests and regulatory capture (Hatzopoulos, 2012: 95).
However, the welfare systems of the original EU members did clearly con-
verge initially. Between 1958 and the early 1970s, national social models in 
Western Europe shed many of their most obvious differences and a roughly 
similar model came to be accepted as desirable. Enlargement, the economic 
crises of the 1970s, and the “restructuring” that followed made direct har-
monisation increasingly difficult as, at the national level, the functionalist 
consensus over welfare provision convergence in Western Europe was deci-
sively broken by the disparate approaches taken to addressing the econom-
ic impact of the “oil shocks” of the mid to late 1970s (Hemerijck, 2013: 
89), while within the EU, the impact of these massive structural economic 
changes brought to a decisive end, in the MSs’ favour, the long running 
debate over the desirability of a supranationally “harmonised” system of 
social security (Hay, Wincott, 2012: 159–160). Convergence, meanwhile, 
had occurred across the EU in some areas but this was generally only at 
a synthetic level in terms of the recognition of the need for universal and 
comprehensive service coverage. At both the ideological and the service 
provision and delivery levels significant differences remained.
Nevertheless, once the basic asymmetry between economic and social 
integration was recognised, the EU found itself increasingly engaging in 
the social policy field, for instance, when the desire for economic and 
monetary integration led to the recognition that employment and social 
policy had to be addressed at the EU level. Indeed as Martinsen notes, 
“the market building process of the EU implies considerable social inte-
gration through the abolition of national barriers to the internal market. 
Free movement principles and Competition Law are thus fundamental 
challenges to the traditional logic of “closure” [of the social space] to the 
Member States” (2013: 67). As the Single Market was consolidated “so-
cial” questions (social dumping, exportability of benefits, etc.) inevitably 
re-emerged, not only in relation to the legal aspects of social externalities 
produced by economic integration but also on the political level as elites 
became aware of the political need to “bind” economic integration within 
an overarching social framework in order to maintain the legitimacy of the 
project. This inevitably challenged once again the notion of the national 
embedment of welfare policy.
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Thus although it was widely acknowledged that the Single Market raised 
the issue of the need for EMU which itself made “Social Europe” both 
possible and necessary, the problem was how to achieve this within an 
EU social policy environment where the CEU did not have the right of 
initiative enabling it to control the policy process.
Beyond the constricted areas in which the CEU has a policy initiation role 
and the “negative integration” effects of the abolition of barriers under the 
internal market rubric, the EU can promote an integrative social policy in 
two ways; judicial policymaking through the ECJ and so-called “soft law” 
measures which came to be associated with the Open Method of Coordi-
nation (OMC) (Terpan, 2015: 72).10 As the former is beyond the current 
scope of this paper it is to the latter we now turn.11
By the beginning of the 1990s, the Member States had faced something 
of a “double bind” (Ferrara, 2005; Hemerijck, 2013) in terms of dealing 
with social questions in an EU context. At the EU level, states were com-
mitted to the promotion of market integration which often significant-
ly impacted traditional approaches to domestic level social intervention, 
while at the domestic level, they were severely constrained in terms of 
political legitimacy and support in the face of any curtailment of welfare 
provision across the policy spectrum from health care for the elderly to 
the quality of postal services.
The need for a recalibration of welfare systems across Europe, leading to 
welfare retrenchment, combined with the social policy impasse at the EU 
level was the driving force behind the adoption of the policy coordination 
10  Policymaking through the ECJ is considered “hard law”, while the OMC is con-
sidered “soft law” Terpan (2015: 87–88) presents a useful overview of which EU policy areas 
can be considered to be governed by “hard” and “soft” law. Szyszcak (2013: 323–27) on the 
other hand, outlines a useful guide to the form and content of “soft law” in this context. In 
the European Studies literature, Wallace (2005: 79–89) provides an outline of the range of 
“governance methods” used in the EU context – Classical “community method”, EU regu-
latory mode (single market/competition policy), EU “distributional mode” (cohesion policy 
and structural funds), “Intensive transgovernmentalism” (immigration, asylum and security 
policy) and finally, “policy coordination” (soft law and OMC), while Büchs (2007: 4–6) 
notes that significant differences exist within the policy coordination sphere, both between 
the broad notion of “soft governance/soft law” and OMC and within the application of 
OMC itself in the various spheres in which it is (or has been) used, namely, monetary policy, 
employment, pensions and social exclusion. 
11  For a fuller discussion of the ECJ’s role in this process, see Greer (2006). Although 
his paper focuses on the ECJ and traditional neofunctionalism as a theoretical explanation 
rather than on the CEU and historical institutionalism, our conclusions on the impact of EU 
institutions on social policy are broadly similar.
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logic behind the OMC. Both the CEU and the MSs sought to benefit 
from this new arrangement. The CEU was keen to address the negative 
perception that a neo-liberal EU was driving welfare retrenchment and 
thus sought to correct the perceived imbalance between negative and 
positive integration, while the MSs sought to confirm their preeminent 
position in social policy making, affirming their control of the process by 
noting that the harmonisation of so many diverse systems was impossible. 
In this context the adoption of the OMC made sense as convergence 
occurred around the position that OMC represented a “middle way” solu-
tion (Büchs, 2007: 11) to the “double bind” facing social policy in the 
EU. The MSs thought they had regained control of the process, while the 
CEU also saw opportunities to further its own agenda.
The CEU capitalised on this “window of opportunity” by adopting the 
notion that economic and social policy must be viewed as interdependent 
and that the EU had to be about more than just “markets and money” 
to succeed. Indeed on this point, and specifically in relation to SSGI, 
Szyszczak (2013: 320) notes that from here on, the CEU assumed a cen-
tral role in driving forward the EU agenda on the modernisation of SSGI 
ensuring in the process their compatibility with EU law and policy, “Eu-
ropeanising” SSGI by means of the tools associated with new governance 
and soft law. In order to placate the MS, the subsidiarity principle was 
reaffirmed, as was recognition that MSs’ diversity was a strength not a 
weakness. In concrete terms however, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) 
saw a new method of coordination developed, in relation to the launching 
of the European Employment Strategy (EES), based on the promotion of 
broadly formulated common social policy goals combined with iterative 
and mandatory learning. This strengthened the role of EU institutions 
in goal setting and benchmarking while decision-making, stricto senso re-
mained within the competence of the MSs.
By the time of the Lisbon Agenda in 2000 this informal “soft law” (Fer-
rera et al., 2003: 366) approach to policy coordination had been officially 
recognised as the OMC. In its ideal form the OMC approach begins 
with the Council of Ministers agreeing on a common set of objectives, 
including indicators and benchmarks, where appropriate, drafted by the 
CEU. Using this list of benchmarks and indicators the MSs then translate 
the CEU’s guidelines into domestic policies subsequently reporting their 
progress on both the policies implemented and those planned. The CEU 
then evaluates these efforts and identifies best practices formulating new 
recommendations for each MS. Peer review exercises involving the MSs 
as well as regional, municipal, and non-governmental actors provide the 
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opportunity for feedback into the further development of national policy 
feeding into the process of guideline reformation. The results are pub-
lished in joint reports, which the Council must approve, with the MSs 
then expected to implement the policy (Versluis et al., 2011: 62).
In this context, the CEU’s authoritative leading role is seemingly replaced 
by that of the MSs’ representatives; the Council becomes the primary 
venue while the CEU effectively takes on the role of facilitator in terms 
of ideas, networks, etc. Policy made in this way is not legally binding, 
depending instead on the MSs refining and implementing the propos-
als, though the CEU is also tasked with monitoring the MSs’ outputs 
(Ladrech, 2010: 30). However, what actually tends to happen is that the 
CEU acts as a “purposeful opportunist” or as a “policy entrepreneur” (Ma-
jone, 2009: 42) – a political subject willing and able to opportunistically 
exploit its own limited resources in order to drive forward the creation of 
new and desirable policies (Cram, 1997: 155) – structuring the decision 
agenda and engaging in “idea promotion”. After Lisbon, this model was 
rolled out beyond the EES to include social inclusion (2000), pensions 
(2001) and healthcare and long-term care (2004).
The reality this produces is perhaps best expressed by Ferrera with his 
characterisation of European welfare states as “semi-sovereign” with their 
national welfare systems effectively “nested” within the wider notion of 
Social Europe (Ferrera, 2005: 119).
The MSs have historically been able to shield their social systems from the 
EU’s scrutiny by arguing that such interactions in public service systems 
should be exempt from internal market considerations. Since the Treaty 
of Amsterdam (1997) however, the ECJ and the CEU have stipulated 
that while MSs’ welfare “systems” remain sacrosanct, the inputs into these 
systems – labour, capital, machinery, drugs, etc., – arrive via market mech-
anisms and, as such, are captured by internal market mechanisms (Greer, 
2006: 145).
Legally then, social policy remains firmly in the national domain, though 
policies on gender equality, social inclusion, migrants etc., have emerged 
at the EU level (Hay, Wincott, 2012: 147). The attempts of the EU to 
address core social welfare issues – for instance, through the promotion 
of the “European Social Model” notion (Hay, Wincott, 2012: 152–154; 
Adnett, Hardy, 2005) – have generally failed in the face of firm MSs’ 
resistance. In reality, however, the CEU has promoted a number of idea-
tional attempts to reinvigorate traditional engrenage through, for instance, 
the mechanism of the “social exclusion process” providing something of a 
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model for the “purposeful opportunist” approach. The CEU is thus able, 
for instance, to finesse its coordinating role in the OMC process or to 
leverage its regulatory authority to structure debate in the direction it 
deems most appropriate, exploiting windows of opportunity to purposive-
ly pursue its own cohesion agenda while at the same time avoiding direct 
confrontation with the MSs.
4. Institutions and Institutional Theory 
Mainstream state-centric integration theory views institutions as instru-
mental tools in the hands of their creators (Moravcsik, 1998: 18). This 
conclusion reflects rather poorly on how the EU is now broadly under-
stood to function within the context of multi-level governance (Hooge, 
Marks, 2001).
The EU is the most densely “institutionalised” networked system of states 
in history. Institutional theory thus seems to be an appropriate choice of 
theoretical framework.12 Although institutionalism has many variants (Pe-
ters, 2012; Lowdes, Roberts, 2013), historical institutionalism has been 
identified as having the best explanatory value for our purposes. 
Institutions matter because they determine the roles and capacity of 
groups and individuals in policy making thus influencing actors’ abilities 
to attain their policy preferences. Institutions are both tangible and in-
tangible. While “formal rules, compliance procedures and standard op-
erating procedures” (Hall, 1986: 9) remain important, both formal and 
informal rules shape actor behaviour. An institution then is a complex 
mix of rules and procedures governing a given set of human interactions 
(Stone, Sweet, 2001: 6).
States are bounded rational actors but intensive interaction creates inter-
dependence making unilateral state action increasingly inefficient. Gov-
ernment action by MSs is central to this process and “hard bargaining” 
12  Institutional theory has a long standing in political science. The New Institutional 
variant discussed here – historical institutionalism – was a core part of the so-called “com-
parativist turn” (Rosamond, 2000: 106) in EU studies which pivoted away from traditional 
international relations concerns with binary questions of “state(s) v superstate” and “heroic 
set piece advances through historic moments of inter-state bargaining” towards a concern 
with day-to-day politics, administrative routines, position formation and policy implemen-
tation across the entire EU governance system. In the integration theory literature then the 
concern with “institutions” is comparatively novel.
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over preferences occurs, but states are neither unitary actors nor they 
are the only actors. Thus, despite Moravcsik, EU institutions13 must be 
viewed as independent of member state control. Moreover, contrary to 
functional theory, institutions cannot be designed simply to perform the 
duties and roles set out for them by their creators in principal-agent terms 
because their creators generally work with short-term horizons and rarely 
take account of the potential long-term results of institutional choices 
which can often have unintended consequences. In addition, institutional 
arrangements are often difficult to amend because of the obstacles to 
change created by the presence of veto-holders, multiple veto-decision 
points, super-majorities or prohibitive procedural decision rules. Institu-
tions are therefore often referred to as “sticky”.
Over time, various “externalities” emerge from institutional design and 
practice. Governments are generally forced to adjust their preferences 
and behaviour to avoid high transaction or compliance costs. This prefer-
ence shifting or “shifting of loyalties and expectations” (Haas, 1958: 16) 
can thus be seen rather as the unintended result of a series of incremental 
decisions to shift competences from the national to the European lev-
el, motivated by the inefficiencies exposed in previous integration steps 
where other choices were perceived to have been more costly in the short 
term (Leuffen et al., 2013: 66).
The notion of “path dependence” is the core of historical institutionalism. 
Past decisions and/or outcomes can have a defining impact on present 
or future outcomes. Once a decision is made to move down a particu-
lar path, it becomes sub-optimal to go back and start again. Instead, a 
series of compromise decisions are integrated into the system in an at-
tempt to correct the flaws or change the outcomes. In this way, rules and 
procedures become “locked in” as actors prefer to adjust their strategies 
to accommodate the status quo rather than trying to affect significant 
structural change in the system. This is perhaps best expressed by Pierson 
(2004: 164) when he notes that “agents of change may play the starring 
role in the dramatic conclusion, but their appearance in the final chapter 
is often heavily dependent on preceding developments occurring over an 
extended period”.
Institutional forms are then frequently quite resilient for a number of rea-
sons. Institutional rules are often hard to change; deliberately so because 
13  It is important to distinguish between everyday usage of the word “institutions” 
as in “the institutions of the EU” and its more intangible usage in neo-institutional theory.
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they are designed to promote stability and predictability. Moreover, ac-
tors are usually intimately aware of the “sunk costs” in the creation of an 
institution and of the side costs of unravelling the initial “bargain”. Fi-
nally, as individual institutions are usually embedded in wider systems of 
institutionalised networks and rules, institutional change may precipitate 
changes in other connected institutions or, render the institution in ques-
tion incompatible with other associated parts of the network.
While this framework is good at explaining why national level structures 
are often difficult to change, why MSs’ opposition to EU-level social pol-
icy is so extensive and why EU social policy has developed in the way it 
has, as Peters (2012: 77–83) notes, while HI can explain the persistence 
of institutional patterns it is rather less good at explaining – primarily by 
means of the notion of punctuated equilibrium – how change occurs. By 
focusing on the institutions themselves as the sole explanatory factor, it 
lacks a robust endogenous understanding of agency.
This problem was addressed by Knill (2001: 4–5) who argues that we 
need to be able to determine when a purely “institutional” explanation 
is sufficient and when this has to be supplemented with reference to the 
strategic agency of the actors involved. Institutional explanations suffice 
when European policies do not appear to directly challenge the core in-
stitutional patterns of national administrative traditions or require only 
relatively small adjustments within the institutional core.14 If a Europe-
an-level policy is seen to be in direct opposition to these core national 
structures and institutions, and the CEU does not have the right of initia-
tive in the policy area concerned, then an institutional explanation for the 
inevitable domestic opposition is likely to suffice. If, however, such a pol-
icy is deemed not to challenge core national administrative traditions the 
process of domestic adaptation is not so easily addressed by institutional 
explanations alone. Non-institutional factors have to be considered, thus 
reintroducing the notion of agency.
14  Administrative traditions are defined by Knill (2001: 4) as “general patterns of 
administrative styles and structures which are strongly embedded in the macro-institutional 
context of the state tradition, the legal system and the politico-administrative system of a 
country”. This focus on the pivotal role of “core state powers” was subsequently taken up by 
Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2014).
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5.  The CEU’s Role in Social Policy Making: 
Stealthy, Covert and Uninvited?
As an institution, the CEU has quite limited power resources.15 Adminis-
tratively, it has developed in a rather different way from that of the MSs. 
It has a limited capacity for day-to-day management and a power of ini-
tiative which is constrained in many areas. In addition, its redistributive 
powers remain quite weak. Its powers as a regulator and its “ideation-
al” power are formidable, however. As such, its real power is in the area 
of “agenda shaping” (Majone, 2009: 42–63) and in adopting the role of 
“purposeful opportunist” – where it tries to maximise its autonomy within 
the agent-principal relationship it has with the MSs – in exploiting policy 
“windows of opportunity” as they arise. Success, however, remains highly 
differentiated across the various sectors within which it is involved, pri-
marily because of the historically path-dependent character of the distri-
bution of power, resources, and institutions in each sector.
In this context, social policy remains an interesting research field precise-
ly because of the MSs’ strong opposition to further integration and thus 
provides an interesting test case on the extent of the Commission’s power 
and influence, primarily in the regulatory and ideational realms. Intergov-
ernmentalism and inter-state bargaining alone cannot easily explain the 
development of EU social policy to date. Rather, “it is now increasingly 
accepted that much of the movement towards integration has resulted 
from the gradual bureaucratic pressure from the Commission” (Cram, 
1997: 157).
How else then can we seek to understand and explain current develop-
ments in EU-wide SSGI implementation and in EU social policy more 
generally? As has been noted, initially by Majone (1996, 2009) and lat-
terly by Greer (2006) and Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2014), the process 
of European Integration is essentially a “stealthy” one. The CEU must 
work within certain preordained boundaries, avoiding opposition from 
within the Council and moving primarily by means of various “soft law” 
15  Given the space constraints applicable here, the fact that the Commission is not 
a unitary actor has not been explicitly addressed. In reality, however, agency and preference 
formation in the Commission follow various “logics” at different times and can be motivated 
either by technocratic problem solving, ideologically driven policy seeking or a desire to 
maximise organisational competences (whether at the DG level or in terms of the Commis-
sion as a whole) vis-a-vis the Member States or the European Parliament (Hartlapp et al., 
2014: 5–7).
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mechanisms, regulatory usage or the creation of relatively small scale ex-
penditure programmes, for example, through the building of “ideational 
networks” (such as e.g. ESPON).16 Minimum standard and goal setting is 
the name of the game here with the CEU endeavouring to “create a role 
for itself” in a broader standard-setting process. Szyszczak confirms this 
noting that “Commission”s actions created a debate around SSGIs that 
has allowed for Europeanization processes to permeate into an area of 
competence traditionally, and jealously, protected by the Member States 
(2013: 320)”.
Moreover, Terpan (2015: 74–76) explains how soft law should be con-
sidered in this context, relating it to the nature of the obligation and the 
enforcement mechanism. The nature of the obligation to implement “soft 
law” in the MSs may be viewed by them as compelling (hard), illustrative 
(soft) or as deriving no obligations at all. The enforcement mechanism 
in terms of a “hard” obligation in relation to the implementation of “soft 
law” is either soft or none, a soft obligation is hard, soft or none, while 
the enforcement mechanism for no obligation in terms of “soft law” is soft 
enforcement. To meet the requirements for “soft law” implementation, 
formalised organisational structures and procedures are required.17
The norms determining “soft law” are usually similar to those for hard law 
norms. However, they are quasi-legal as they are given a form that clearly 
resembles hard law. “When the source is quasi-legal, there is a strong prob-
ability that an enforcement mechanism is provided, through procedures, 
information diffusion, bureaucratic operations, and delegation of authori-
ties to enforce and implement rules” (Terpan, 2015: 75). How “soft law” is 
16  The ESPON (European Spatial Planning Observation Network) Programme aims 
at supporting the reinforcement of EU Cohesion Policy in 28 Member States. It was orig-
inally set up in 2002. It is funded by the EU Commission, the 28 Member States and the 
Partner Countries, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland with additional co-fi-
nancing from the European Regional Development Fund. ESPON is an independent re-
search fund controlled by the EU Commission and the participating countries. The Manag-
ing Authority has its seat in Luxembourg. The predecessor to ESPON, the European Spatial 
Development Perspective, was born at an Informal Ministerial Meeting in Potsdam in 1999. 
The key policy orientations were outlined for the entire European territory: (1) balanced 
and polycentric development, (2) good access to regions and services and (3) intelligent 
management of natural and cultural resources. When the ESDP programme was finalised, 
ESPON essentially replaced it.
17  Büchs (2007: 20) conceptualises this OMC “mode of operation” around Robert 
Putnam’s theory of two-level games (1988). A discussion of this point, however, merits an 
article of its own and thus the decision was made to restrict the discussion here to institu-
tional theory.
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considered in different MSs may actually then, to some extent, be related 
to what institutional capacity the MSs have to implement it.
The CEU’s regulatory power helps it to shape agendas enabling it to de-
liver its preferred policy outcomes while attempting to avoid direct con-
frontation with the MSs over core state functions. Soft law tools such as 
the OMC, combined with the creation of new arenas for disgruntled na-
tional-level actors, venue-shoppers, academics or technical bodies slowly 
adjust the decision calculus at the national level where “windows of oppor-
tunity” for the CEU’s intervention eventually emerge, enabling it to play a 
facilitating role. The ECJ also plays an important role here in consistently 
ruling against the MSs in relation to the applicability of internal market 
rules in the social policy and healthcare fields.18
Drawing on the work of Klein and O’Higgins (1985) on the NHS in the 
UK and on Majone, on the CEU as a regulatory polity and on its desire to 
expand its own power resources, Cram (1993; 1997) distilled the notion 
of the CEU as “purposeful opportunist”. Examples of CEU activism in 
the social policy area are, for example, addressed in the work of Valadas 
(2006) on Territorial Employment Pacts (TEPs) in Portugal, and Greer 
(2006) on the impact of the Working Time Directive on the UK NHS. The 
volume edited by Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2014) takes this research 
one stage further by noting that while the CEU itself is not a unitary actor 
and the mechanisms and strategies used by individual DGs differ, the 
initial barrier to the encroachment into the realm of core state powers has 
now been removed as integration expands into the fields of fiscal, military 
procurement and administrative policy. This conclusion clearly supports 
our contention that this stealthy or covert approach to integration is now 
18   Case law is reasonably clear on this issue. The primary cases cited are: Case 
C-120/95, Nicolas Decker v. Caisse de maladie des employes prives [1998] ECR I-01831 and 
Case C-158/96, Raymond Kohll v. Union des caisses de maladie [1998] ECR I-01931. While 
the particulars of each case are not at issue here given space constraints – the facts of the 
cases are covered in Ferrera (2005: 128–131), de Búrca (2005: 6–7) and Martinsen (2013: 
54–55) – their outcomes demonstrated that while the Member States remained notionally 
“sovereign” in the social policy field, this did not give them a blanket exemption from compe-
tition or internal market rules, thus allowing national level welfare policies to remain “islands 
beyond the reach” of EU law. Three further cases served to decisively impact this decision 
still further: Case C-157/99, B.S.M Geraets-Smits v. Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. 
Peerbooms v. Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-05473; Case C-368/98, Ab-
don Vanbraekel and Others v. Alliance nationale des mutualités chrétiennes (ANMC) [2001] 
ECR I-05363; and Case C-385/99, V.G. Muller-Faure v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij 
OZ Zoorgverzekeringen UA and E.E.M. van Riet v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO 
Zorgverzekeringen [2003] ECR I-04509.
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also discernible in the implementation of Social Services of General Inter-
est in the European Union. 
6.  Conclusion: Modest but Discernible 
Convergence 
This paper has sought to draw together the social policy, European stud-
ies, spatial planning and European law literatures on European social pol-
icy and SSGI in an attempt to better understand the dynamics of SSGI 
implementation and convergence.
Given the results produced by the Humer et al (2013) typology on SSGI 
implementation, how can we best understand the social change processes 
it describes? The typological trends suggest that a change in emphasis and 
a new set of lenses will produce a rather different picture to that delivered 
by traditional social policy typologies. In implementation terms the view is 
much more dynamic with transitions more clearly discernible.
In the typology, the NMS (with the exception of Hungary) adhere to the 
primary geographical pattern dividing the Mediterranean and North-Cen-
tral European spheres rather than generating a new explicitly East Eu-
ropean or post-Communist cluster of their own. Moreover, one of the 
clusters clearly predominates, attracting countries from across all areas of 
Europe except the Mediteranean. This suggests that something important 
in respect of SSGI implementation convergence is happening.
In our qualitative analysis of the typology advanced by Humer et al, we 
can clearly identify two clusters and one “repository for failures”. Cluster 
1 – including  Bismarckians, Nordics, Anglo-Liberals in Esping-Andersen’s 
terms – most likely “clusters” because of their high absorption capacity 
and their strong administrative capabilities. Whatever the political philos-
ophy behind their welfare trajectories these states can generally “deliver” 
change. Cluster two – the Mediterranean countries – “clusters” because their 
states are much less adept at implementing change and administratively 
they still rely on key individuals and clientelism etc., to deliver any sort of 
change, which even if successful will likely be uneven. Cluster 3 is more a 
transient “waiting room” for transitioning states than a cluster in a positive 
sense. Though Ireland may be able to escape, the prospects look bleak for 
Greece and Hungary, both of which continued, during the 1990s–2000s, 
to implement costly clientelistic welfare policies that they could not af-
ford. This came to a juddering halt with the financial crash.
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Viewed in the context of continuing de jure MS dominance over social pol-
icy in the EU, these findings become rather problematic. Initial attempts 
at harmonisation in the social policy field soon ran into MS opposition 
and thus in the end rarely went beyond a demand for universal and com-
prehensive service coverage. At both the ideological level and in terms 
of service provision and delivery, national differences remain significant, 
reflecting the reality of the continuing influence of separate histories, in-
stitutions and the path dependencies they create. Consequently, harmo-
nisation has long ceased to be an effective mode of integration, so why 
then is convergence occurring?19
Historical institutionalism was used to provide the theoretical context for 
social policy developments at the EU level. It captures well the reasons 
why bureaucratic and administrative changes are difficult and why formal 
MSs’ dominance in the social policy field exists at the EU level. Institu-
tions, however, rarely function as initially intended by their creators, they 
seek active engagement and often attempt to break out of the “princi-
pal-agent” framework upon which they were originally based in order to 
develop some measure of decision-making and policy autonomy. 
Moreover, HI also provides a plausible account of why convergence occurs. 
Institutions shape political behaviour in three ways; through rules, prac-
tices, and narratives. All three can be seen to have had an impact on the 
particular ways in which SSGI have been implemented in the EU context. 
Rules (Single Market) set the framework; practices (OMC/“soft law”) are 
the enablers while the narratives are provided by the policy entrepreneurs. 
The efforts of historical institutionalism to explain major change as the 
notion of “punctuated equilibrium” do not go beyond an endogenous ex-
planation of change thus necessitating a turn towards agency. It is here 
that we find a plausible explanation for SSGI implementation conver-
gence in the activism, or “purposeful opportunism” of the CEU. Crucial-
ly, this explanation more accurately reflects how the day-to-day politics of 
the EU actually function.
This is usually discussed in the context of ongoing processes of Europeani-
zation. This reflects the CEU’s “activism” in forwarding its own policy agen-
da through the promotion of “soft law” instruments – including Green and 
19  It is interesting to note that Commissioner Thyssen has recently been quite vocal 
in “flying a kite” for the notion of harmonising social benefits levels across the EU (Remarks 
by Commissioner Marianne Thyssen: Policy Orientations for a Social Europe, 9th June, 
2015, Press Release STATEMENT/15/5150).
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White papers, Communications, Staff Working papers, FAQs, reports and 
guides, and Commission’s comments on the documents of other organisa-
tions or stakeholders – as well as the co-option of national-level protagonists 
involved in “venue shopping” exercises; the promotion of interest group 
and academic research networks and the exploitation of certain “windows 
of opportunity” arising from day-to-day politics. This notion was conceptu-
alised by the term “purposeful opportunism” where the CEU attempts to 
promote its own policy agenda in areas where it does not have the “right of 
initiative” but in so doing attempts to avoid direct confrontation with core 
MSs’ interests, hence the labels, “stealthy, covert and uninvited”.
The data uncovered by Humer et al. suggest that SSGI can be added to 
the list of areas where integration is being driven by the CEU in a manner 
which was not originally envisaged and which may lack transparency and 
democratic accountability. The MSs are not mere bystanders in this pro-
cess though they do seem to have been comprehensively out manoeuvred 
in relation to expectations over the utility of the OMC process.
In conclusion, given the analysis above, how then can we characterise this 
ongoing process in respect of SSGI implementation? The key issue here is 
how institutional change takes place within the MSs in a policy area where 
they – not the EU – are sovereign. The CEU’s ideational power, expressed 
in terms of rules, practices and narratives seems adept at reshaping na-
tional and sub-national level institutions dealing with SSGI implemen-
tation – either directly through benchmarking and evaluation practices 
associated with the OMC approach or indirectly through the creation 
of new policy arenas and venues not controlled by the MSs. This is not, 
per se a grand, explicit and political refocusing of elite loyalties at the MS 
level as neo-functionalism argued, but rather an incremental process of 
administrative experimentation prompted by the CEU and designed to 
promote its own power.20
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STEALTHY, COVERT AND UNINVITED?  
COMMISSION’S “ACTIVISM” IN THE IMPLEMENTATION  
CONVERGENCE OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF  
GENERAL INTEREST IN THE EU
Summary
The broad aspirations of social policy in the EU continue to be the preserve 
of the Member States as the particular histories, ideas, and institutions upon 
which national social policies are based remain quite heterogeneous. A process 
of convergence is nevertheless discernible in respect of policy implementation. 
The reasons for this relate to the nature of the European integration process but 
should not be confused with the broad adoption of a notional “European So-
cial Model”, the harmonisation of national policies or, more generally, with the 
classical approach to EU policy making in the social field. This paper instead 
explores how the implementation typology on Social Services of General Interest 
produced by Humer et al. (2013) can be understood in relation to the way in 
which the European Commission has continued to act as a “purposeful oppor-
tunist” by employing “policy entrepreneurism” in the context of the various “new 
governance” approaches associated with EU social policy. 
Keywords: services of general interest, social services of general interest, social 
services
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POTAJNO, PRIKRIVENO I NEPOZVANO? 
AKTIVNOSTI EUROPSKE KOMISIJE VEZANE ZA  
KONVERGENCIJU SOCIJALNIH SLUŽBI  
OD OPĆEG INTERESA U EU 
Sažetak
Opće karakteristike i težnje socijalne politike u Europskoj uniji ostaju u na-
dležnosti država članica budući da su povijesni razvoj, ideje i institucije na 
kojima se temelje nacionalne socijalne politike i dalje vrlo raznoliki. Primjetan 
je, međutim, proces konvergencije kad se radi o primjeni socijalnih politika. Ra-
zlozi za to povezani su s prirodom procesa europske integracije no ne treba ih 
miješati s općim usvajanjem nacionalnog »europskog socijalnog modela«, har-
monizacijom nacionalnih javnih politika, ili, općenitije, s klasičnim pristupom 
kreiranu javnih politika EU na području socijalne skrbi. Rad se bavi načinom 
na koji se implementacijska tipologija Humera et al. (2013) primijenjena na 
socijalne službe od općeg interesa može shvatiti u odnosu na činjenicu de se 
Europska komisija nastavila ponašati kao »promišljeni oportunist« koristeći 
»poduzetništvo u javnim politikama« u kontekstu različitih pristupa »novog 
upravljanja« koji se povezuju sa socijalnom politikom EU. 
Ključne riječi: službe od općeg interesa, socijalne službe od općeg interesa, 
socijalne službe
